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Americanism in Global Markets
Bradley K. EDMISTER
I. Introduction
It’s a pleasure to be participating at the Institute of World Affairs’ conference on Americanism. Although 
identifi ed as a conference on “Americanism”, any study of Americanism in international affairs today must even-
tually engage the phenomenon of “anti-Americanism”, a topic fashionable in recent years and which occupied, in 
different ways, a good portion of each of this conference’s keynote speeches. Although anti-Americanism is 
hardly a homogenous or readily identifi able phenomenon, one can identify broad themes put forth by individuals 
and groups engaged in various forms of contemporary critique of the United States and its role in global society, 
generally lamenting the seemingly irresistible and expanding infl uence of the United States in one or another 
aspect of world affairs (variously described as “hegemony” or “imperialism”) and the perceived unwillingness of 
the United States to subject itself to something called “international law” or to other binding norms external to its 
own national self-determination (often described as “unilateralism”). These critiques typically rely on a view of 
international political structure as an inevitable progression from disparate nation states, to regional federal 
unions, to (it is hoped) a single, collective supranational organization. In this view, the nation state is a failure, as 
evidenced by the modern history of imperialism and national confl ict necessarily attendant to classic European 
statism, both within Europe and as subsequently exported. At best the national system is a waystation to some 
greater form of human political order. The globalization of commercial and fi nancial markets is viewed as further 
evidencing the limitations of the nation state by heralding the arrival of a supranational economy of transnational 
actors operating beyond the parameters within which the legal or practical power of sovereign states can be exer-
cised, thus necessitating a submission of such forces to some transcendent international organization.
This vision depends, however, on a series of myths and assumptions that belie the actual workings of the 
functional global economy. The fi rst is the myth of international law. Globalization of commercial and fi nancial 
markets has succeeded not on the heels of expanding transnational legal concepts, but instead as a complex con-
tractual patchwork of largely national and local legal structures constructed and agreed ad hoc among transaction 
and market participants. Globalization is successful precisely because parties have clear recourse to predictable 
national judicial and enforcement bodies and a plurality of such legal systems available to support a free market 
for structuring innovative transactions and relationships that facilitate their commercial goals, applying the laws 
of jurisdictions that best meet their needs. Another myth is that successful national powers will inevitably impose 
their internal social and economic norms on an undesirous global community, unless brought to bear through 
some new supranational organization—and the United States represents the lone remaining national superpower 
at which such energy must be directed. In fact, the conspicuous presence of American companies and profession-
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als in the global economy is largely an outgrowth of the desire of other national actors to take advantage, vari-
ously, of the legal, fi nancial and commercial expertise that successful American fi rms have pioneered in the pro-
cess of surviving and dominating an intensely competitive domestic free market and regional and global markets 
as they have opened for business.
By exploring these myths in turn, a more benign, indeed decidedly more positive picture of Americanism in 
contemporary world affairs comes into focus. On the other hand, anti-American movements are revealed as a dis-
parate collage of myriad fragmented ideologies, much more introspective and responsive to their own interests 
than is widely perceived by those who support or study such currents, and which can perhaps best be analyzed 
and studied not through the exploration of alleged defi ciencies in the target of their prejudice, the United States, 
but separately as products of their own unique origins, motivations and characteristics.
II. The Myth of International Law
As an American lawyer living abroad and active in international commercial and fi nancial transactions, I am 
perhaps close to what most laypersons would imagine as an “international lawyer” practicing on the front lines of 
globalization. Nevertheless, I have never experienced anything akin to “international law”. This may be counter-
intuitive to those who look at the world economy, replete with seemingly stateless multinational corporate enti-
ties, fi nancial institutions and organizations and see what they perceive to be a robust, globalized economy 
detached from national infl uences as a fait accompli. Professor Brunkhorst, in his excellent speech, proclaimed 
boldly, “For the fi rst time, we witness ... completely globalized functional systems”.1) Moreover, the globalization 
of functional systems, it is suggested, has necessitated the development of extra-national organs. As he analyzed, 
“global law and world politics have established their own organizations beyond the state and have caused a 
detaching of a community’s politico-legal constitution from the state”.2) In international business and commerce, 
the problem of the denuded state consequently reemerges, because, as he concludes, “the legitimation problem of 
late capitalism as still bound to the nation state has resurfaced in the ‘post-national constellation’ (J. Habermas) 
of the globally debordered turbo-capitalism”.3)
I believe that economic globalization has in fact been successful, not because of any such detachment from 
national structures, but precisely because of its continued grounding to predictable and established national legal 
and jurisdictional concepts and the diversity and dynamism that such attachments have provided to international 
transaction participants. Commercial transactions require as a prerequisite three fundamentals: a clear set of rules 
to govern the transaction, a predictable forum for interpreting and applying the rules in case of dispute, and an 
ability to exercise physical power, through agreed entities and procedures, over relevant transaction participants 
or their assets to ensure satisfaction in the event of breaches or defaults. This is straightforward in purely domestic 
transactions. The laws of the relevant local and national jurisdictions apply. Additional or substitute arrangements 
1) Hauke Brunkhorst, “American and Europe, the Rift Within the West and the Future of East Asia”, delivered at the Institute 
of Word Affairs, Conference on Americanism, March 2006.
2) Id.
3) Id. Emphasis in original.
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are made by contract within the context of the applicable governing laws. Well understood judicial forums exist 
to adjudicate disputes (or alternative dispute resolution may be elected), and the physical presence of parties and 
their assets within the jurisdiction allows the executive powers of the state to be effectively brought to bear in the 
event of breaches or defaults.
Participants in international transactions face the added diffi culty that the parties and their assets are often 
physically located within different jurisdictions applying differing legal systems. This has not, however, engen-
dered supranational legal solutions. Instead, parties to international transactions, by mutual assent, have created 
structures that provide comfort to various participants by taking advantage of the unique features of national legal 
systems in order to dissect and separately address transaction risks. Moreover, the ability to choose various 
national laws to apply to portions of transactions makes transnational relationships effi cient. For example, special 
purpose companies facilitating complex international transactions might be established in a tax neutral offshore 
jurisdiction (to avoid uneconomic depletion of cash fl ows), such as the Cayman Islands, which has no mechanism 
for taxation and a well-developed legal system tailored to support such transactions, with ultimate appeals to the 
Privy Counsel in London. New York law might be selected for primary transaction documents, because of the 
sophistication of its commercial laws and experience of New York courts with complex fi nancial transactions. 
The State of New York facilitates such arrangements by permitting parties to specify New York law as the gov-
erning law for their contracts, even when their agreements bear no reasonable relation to New York.4) Addition-
ally, parties may voluntarily choose to adhere to norms established by international market or other organizations. 
This is the case with derivative contracts, which are largely drafted based on forms of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, an international body established by derivative market participants. In this manner, com-
plex transnational structures are created within a carefully selected web of national and state laws and interna-
tional market practice. These structures are supranational in nature and effect, yet entirely dependent on the active 
administration of national and local governments. Only the confi dence of parties in those institutions allows inter-
national transactions to succeed.
This reveals the paradox of the complex global economy. Its success depends necessarily on a symbiosis in 
which transnational effects are achieved through purely national, even local, legal and regulatory systems. Far 
from “eluding border controls”, as surmised by Professor Brunkhorst, the global fi nancial order draws its dyna-
mism, indeed its very life force, from its secure grounding in trusted national and local political structures. More-
over, because of this grounding, individual nations maintain full power to detect and address any perceived 
abuses in the transnational sphere. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in December 
20045) reversed a policy not to regulate hedge funds, due to perceptions of their acting “above the law”, requiring 
them to register with and be regulated by the Commission. In Europe, General Electric famously saw its proposed 
merger with Honeywell in 2001 blocked by European Union anti-trust authorities,6) despite approval in the United 
4) New York General Obligations Law, §5-1401 (Choice of law).
5) U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers; 
Rel No. IA-2333 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at <http://www.sec.gov/rules/fi nal/ia-2333.pdf>.
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States, demonstrating that multinational transactions in fact remain closely monitored and regulated by national 
and local authorities (whatever one thinks of the wisdom of such decisions).
III. The Myth of Hegemony
Herein lies a fundamental feature of the global economy: that a fi rm grounding to nation states, far from 
being the problem, is the turbo-charging force that energizes global capitalism. Moreover, proponents of this 
 system, recognizing the success of the current symbiotic relationship between nation states and transnational 
structures, share a genuine fear that attempts to manufacture supranational legal or other institutions that purport 
to exercise transnational jurisdiction over classes of transactions or economic activity would stultify rather than 
rationalize international markets. Professor Brunkhorst correctly identifi ed the weakness of the Soviet system as 
the control of functional systems “at the price of their productivity”.7) In the same manner, American economic 
actors in the global community treasure the current developing free market of legal and fi nancial systems while 
fearing the potentially stifl ing impact of efforts to subsume national legal systems under any supranational organi-
zation through any process other than the orderly contractual agreement of interested market participants in 
response to perceived market needs, for example, in the creation of international industry groups or self-regula-
tory organizations.
This fear becomes acute distrust when the sponsors of such projects include nations that have not fully 
joined the global free market system. Far from being the established fact heralded by Professor Brunkhorst, or 
“the ruthless economic struggle that embroils every country in the world”, as surmised by Mr. Fini,8) globalization 
of free markets is at best a work in progress. Only 72 of the 157 nations analyzed in the 2006 Index of Economic 
Freedom, published by The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., received ratings of “free” or 
“mostly free”, the rest being classifi ed as “unfree” or “mostly unfree”.9) In order to gradually expand economic 
freedom, the United States seeks to entice less free nations, such as China, to participate more actively, openly 
and transparently in the global capitalist system by demonstrating the unprecedented wealth generation and devel-
opment opportunities available, provided that prospective participants engage in steady economic and, ultimately, 
democratic reform. Herein lies another reason for resistance to the creation of broad, mulitnational political and 
legal organizations to superimpose upon global free markets, namely, a genuine skepticism that allowing non-free 
nations to exert jurisdictional power over the developing global economic order would potentially dilute this 
inducement to reform.
With the recognition of the global capitalist economic system as an intricate tapestry of contractual relation-
ships among willing participants grounded in a free market of national and local legal systems, the conspicuous 
6) Case No. COMP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell, Commission decision of 3 July 2001.
7) Brunkhorst, supra note 1.
8) Massimo Fini, “Americanism and Anti-Americanism: The Role of Europe”, delivered at the Institute of Word Affairs, Con-
ference on Americanism, March 2006.
9) Marc A. Miles, Kim R. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2006 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2006), available at <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/
index/>.
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presence of Americans in global markets comes into focus not as a product of some internally organized manifest 
destiny, but as the fortuitous outcome of a preference among international transaction participants for American 
legal and fi nancial advisors, given the professional technology and dealmaking experience such advisors pro-
vide to parties seeking to succeed in the complex multi-jurisdictional environments of the global economy. An 
examination of statistics for global and regional markets will help illuminate this participation and the unique 
preference of commercial and fi nancial transaction participants for American legal and fi nancial advisors for their 
international transactions, even when their business has no connection to the United States.
Data from mergers and acquisitions provides a useful touchstone, because of the existence of quality global 
data and the multinational character of many such transactions. This data shows that seven of the top ten legal 
advisors globally in announced mergers and acquisitions by value in 2005 were American law fi rms.10) When the 
data is analyzed by numbers of deals, rather than value, once again, seven of the top ten fi rms globally are Ameri-
can, though some different fi rms make the list.11) For cross-border M&A transactions, including announced trans-
actions ranked by value, six of the top ten fi rms globally in 2005 were American.12) More strikingly, in European 
M&A transactions, including announced transactions with a European target or seller ranked by value, six of the 
top ten legal advisors were American law fi rms.13) Data for fi nancial advisors similarly shows a strong bias toward 
American fi rms.14)
These fi gures lend statistical evidence to the proposition that American legal and fi nancial advisors com-
mand a high degree of respect in global commercial and fi nancial markets and are frequently selected in prefer-
ence of advisors with local roots.
A skeptical reader of the published data will naturally wonder to what extent underlying connections with 
the United States in European M&A transactions may have infl uenced the very high rate of selection of American 
legal advisors in European deals. For example, the presence of a U.S. bidder for a European company may infl u-
ence the selection of an American legal advisor by one or more of the transaction participants. In order to screen 
such bias from the results, I analyzed data for announced European transactions in 2005 excluding any transac-
tions involving a U.S. acquirer or target. Nevertheless, four of the top ten legal advisors ranked by value, and half 
of the top twenty, were American law fi rms.15) Thus, even in transactions that contain no primary nexus to the 
United States, American legal advisors are often engaged by transaction participants.
The data supports the conclusion that the seemingly dominant presence of American forces in the global 
economy is less due to the de facto superpower status of the United States than to the technology and experience 
10) Bloomberg, L. P., “Bloomberg 2005 Global Legal Mergers & Acquisitions Rankings”, dated January 3, 2006, p. 7 (M&A 
Legal Advisory League Table: Global Announced Deals Ranked by Volume).
11) Id. at p. 8 (M&A Legal Advisory League Table: Global Announced Deals, Ranked by Count).
12) Id. at p. 13 (M&A Legal Advisory League Table: Cross Border Global Announced Deals, Ranked by Volume).
13) Id. at p. 19 (M&A Legal Advisory League Table: Europe Announced Deals, European Target or Seller, Ranked by Volume).
14) See, e.g., Dealogic, “Dealogic M&A Review”, dated January 4, 2006, p. 17. (Announced League Tables: Global Announced 
M&A and European Announced M&A).
15) Global mergers and acquisitions data of transactions announced in the calendar year 2005 collected by Thomson Financial 
was analyzed to exclude transactions involving a U.S. acquirer or target.
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that American advisors offer transaction participants who are free to choose whomever they please in the 
intensely competitive “turbo-capitalist” global market, to borrow a phrase from Professor Brunkhorst. In this 
light, the continued and expanding role of America in globalization can be seen, not as the imposition of some 
new hegemony, but as the voluntary inclusion at the invitation of European, Asian and other non-U.S. transaction 
participants, for which continued encouragement and cooperative inclusion, rather than the imposition of deaden-
ing supranational structural barriers, seems the appropriate course toward achieving a global functional order 
capable of actualizing economic freedom.
IV. The Mirror Turned Inward: Deconstructing Anti-Americanism
Corollary to the preference of American advisors in international transactions is the general lack of anti-
American sentiment in international commercial and fi nancial markets. In fact, it is not simply anti-American 
sentiments which are suppressed in global markets. As economic freedom increases, so too do the fl ows of 
 capital, labor and goods. This results in both intensifying competition and increased opportunities in new or 
expanding markets. In this environment, the most successful economic actors are those which maintain careful 
detachment from national, regional or local prejudices. This is because operational limitations imposed to satisfy 
such prejudices generally limit economic opportunities and increase costs, to the extent of exclusion of potential 
customers, effi ciencies achievable through scale or low-cost production, or reduced access to supplies, fi nancial 
resources or services. Moreover, intensifying global competition typically means that any such result will proffer 
advantage to competitors not limited by such prejudice, which can ultimately endanger an enterprise’s long term 
prospects or existence. Global markets punish prejudice.
Nevertheless, globalization is hardly established fact, as we have discussed, and such prejudice frequently 
creeps into markets, generally to the detriment of all involved. For example, China has actively cultivated anti-
Japanese and anti-American nationalism as part of the formation of its post-war national identity. However, anti-
Japanese rioting in April 2005 ended in international embarrassment to China and, more signifi cantly, strategic 
rethinking by Japanese and other international corporations, fi nancial institutions and governments regarding the 
political risk environment in China, resulting potentially in reallocation of investments to alternative markets. The 
cultivation of these prejudices again wrought unexpected consequences later in 2005, when the takeover bid 
launched by China National Offshore Oil Company for Unocal Corporation in the United States was effectively 
defeated in part by the ability of the Unocal board of directors to rally anti-Chinese sentiment in America at a 
time when China’s anti-American prejudices had infl amed such moods. With the chain reaction set, other losers 
emerged, as the anti-Chinese reaction in America ultimately deprived Unocal shareholders of the opportunity of 
choosing for themselves. It is noteworthy that the cultivation and use of prejudice by various state and non-state 
actors avoidably created barriers to the effi ciency and development of national and regional economies and the 
global economic system.
Analysis of the popular phenomenon of anti-Americanism consequently requires special handling. As we 
have seen, the prominence of American infl uence in global commercial and fi nancial markets, and the develop-
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ment and fl ourishing of those markets through diverse national and other legal structures via the agreement and 
creativity of transaction participants, rather than normatively imposed supranational organizations, can plausibly 
be explained and advocated. Moreover, prejudice fi nds little comfort in globalization. In this light, anti-American-
ism echoing within various circles comes to be seen as a more limited phenomenon often bound to its conclusions 
not by reason but through the predestination of its root causes, which are frequently local.
While beyond the scope of this study, a wellspring of productive research awaits the scholar inspired by the 
challenge of cataloging and deconstructing strains of anti-Americanism, tying their prejudice to underlying inten-
tions and ideologies, which in turn may yield yet further fi elds of study. Why is it, for example, that various 
groups and individuals have expended such extraordinary energy to reimagine widely understood concepts such 
as “imperialism” and “hegemony” in order to apply these words, as redefi ned, to contemporary American society 
or politics? What emotions do these words evoke that inspires the contortion of their usual meanings to deploy 
against the United States in their rhetorical systems? Similarly, one might explore how the term “multilateral” has 
been reimagined to systematically exclude the numerous multinational forums through which the United States 
engages in diplomacy. As redefi ned, it applies exclusively to actions undertaken through a strikingly limited set of 
specifi ed international organizations or procedures, such as the United Nations or the Kyoto Protocol process. 
Often discounted are America’s contributions to multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (the most successful multilateral organization of the twentieth century), the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, which themselves receive separate derision in many 
anti-American circles. In turn, the word “unilateral” is reimagined to become a designator for multilateral cooper-
ation outside a pre-ordained framework. Multilateral organizations or efforts perceived as providing alternatives 
to the privileged framework are disparaged.
The role of America in global affairs deserves more nuanced attention, and the understanding of anti- 
American currents in Europe and elsewhere can perhaps be illuminated by turning a mirror inward.
